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Abstract 
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I. Central bank reaction function: “Taylor rule” 
The monetary policy strategy of the ECB is of particular interest for the 
analysis of business cycles but even more so for the ongoing debate on rules 
versus discretion in monetary policy. *  In order to explain the interest rate 
decisions of the ECB, one may estimate Taylor rule (1993) type reaction 
functions, according to which an interest rate under the control of the ECB is 
made dependent on variables like the domestic inflation rate and the output gap.  
 In this contribution, we estimate several instrument policy reaction 
functions for the ECB in the period ranging from 1999 to 2005. The results might 
contribute to a better understanding of the bank’s interest rate setting behaviour. 
In particular, the result might help answering two questions, namely (i) whether 
the ECB has consistently followed a (stabilising) rule, and (ii) whether and how 
the ECB behaved differently than the US Fed Federal Reserve (Fed). 
 Due to the short history of EMU data, most papers on ECB monetary 
policy have up to now estimated a Bundesbank or a hypothetical ECB reaction 
function prior to 1999 and then, e.g. by testing its out-of-sample forecast 
properties, compared the implied interest rates with actual ECB rates.† There are 
only a few studies such as, for instance, Fourçans and Vranceanu (2002), 
                                                 
*  See Carstensen and Colavecchio (2004). For the estimation of monetary policy 
reaction functions in general see, e.g., Huang and Lin (2006), Florio (2005) and 
Altavilla and Landolfo (2005). For an application to regime shifts in reaction functions 
see, for instance, Valente (2003). 
†  See, e.g. Clausen and Hayo (2002), Faust et al. (2001), and Smant (2002) for the first 
approach and e.g. Clausen and Hayo (2002) and Gerlach-Kristen (2003) for the latter. 
For a good survey see Sauer and Sturm (2003). 
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Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003), Ullrich (2003) and Surico (2003) which have 
actually estimated an ECB reaction function.  
 Most authors have so far chained up pre-EMU and post-EMU data to 
obtain long series. However, the implicit assumption of structural stability at the 
time of the EMU start inherent in these studies is hardly tenable according to our 
view. Moreover, it is questionable whether one can assume that the national 
central banks in the pre-EMU period followed on average a consistent strategy 
which can be compared without frictions with the strategy of the ECB (Belke and 
Gros, 2005). Hence, we base our analysis in this contribution purely on the euro 
area regime which started in January 1999.  
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section II, we develop 
the theory of the Taylor rule and derive the empirical model. In section III, we 
compare official monetary policy with actual policy as measured by estimations 
of some variants of the Taylor rule. We present simulations for the ECB and the 
Fed and check for deviations of actual monetary policy from the central banks’ 
(Taylor) rules in section IV. Section V concludes.  
II.   Theory of the Taylor rule 
 
In this section, we derive testable implications of the Taylor rule with a 
special focus on the ECB. Of course, analogous considerations apply to Taylor 
rules for characterising the Fed’s monetary policy.  
We start from the usual baseline specification of the Taylor rule concept 
which looks as follows:  
(1) ( ) ( )ttttt yii επβββρρ +⋅+⋅+⋅−+⋅= − 2101 1 . 
The variables included in this specification are the short-term interest rate it, 
the output gap yt, and the domestic inflation rate πt. The parameters β1 and β2 
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reflect the long-run weight of the variables output gap (y) and the inflation rate 
(π), respectively, while the parameter ρ describes the extent of interest rate 
smoothing chosen by monetary policy. Exactly following other studies in this 
field, the money market rate is used to approximate the relevant policy rate. As 
usual, we base our output gap and inflation rate variables on time series which are 
measured ex post for period t. 
An important empirical question relates to the estimated weight on inflation, 
i.e. to the parameter β2. Since it is the real interest rate which actually drives 
private decisions, the size of β2 needs to assure that – as a response to a rise in 
inflation – the nominal interest rate is raised sufficiently to actually increase the 
real interest rate. This so-called ‘Taylor principle’ implies that the coefficient β2 
has to be larger than 1 (Taylor, 1999b, and Clarida et al., 1998). If not, self-
fulfilling bursts of inflation may be possible (see e.g., Bernanke and Woodford, 
1997; Clarida et al., 1998; Clarida et al., 2000; Woodford, 2001). For monetary 
policy to have a stabilising impact on output, a less restrictive condition has to be 
fulfilled, i.e. β1 should be positive.  
In practice, it is usually observed that, especially since the early 1990s, 
central banks worldwide tend to move policy interest rates in small steps without 
reversing their direction quickly (Amato and Laubach, 1999, Castelnuovo, 2003, 
and Rudebusch, 2002). To incorporate this pattern of interest rate smoothing, our 
equation (1) is viewed as the mechanism by which the target interest rate i* is 
determined. The actual interest rate partially adjusts to this target according to 
( ) 1*1 −⋅+⋅−= tt iii ρρ , where ρ is the smoothing parameter. This results finally in 
estimating equations (1) to (3).  
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In addition to this baseline model, we consider either money growth or the 
nominal dollar-euro exchange rate as an additional argument contained in the 
ECB reaction function. The influence of the monetary pillar of the ECB monetary 
policy strategy is examined by the specification:  
(2) ( ) ( )tttttt myii εβπβββρρ +∆⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅−+⋅= − 32101 1 , 
which additionally includes the annual growth rate of money balances M3, 
mt. We include money growth to model the monetary pillar of the ECB strategy 
which emphasizes the prominent role of M3 growth for interest rate decisions. 
This may reflect the leading indicator properties of money growth both for 
inflation (Altimari, 2001) and for the output gap (Coenen et al., 2001).  
We also analyse whether ECB interest rate decisions are affected by 
changes in the nominal exchange rate of the dollar against the euro, exrt:  
(3) ( ) ( )tttttt exryii εβπβββρρ +∆⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅−+⋅= − 32101 1 . 
According to its monetary policy strategy, the ECB claims to pay attention to 
a broad set of economic variables that may help to assess the presence of threats 
to price stability. We see two arguments which speak in favour of an inclusion of 
the exchange rate in the reaction function. First, while it is not clear whether 
central banks directly react and should react to exchange rate changes (Taylor, 
2001), the ECB might have been particularly tempted to counteract devaluations 
in the first years of EMU in order to establish the notion of a strong euro as an 
equivalent successor of the deutschmark. Second, a direct influence of exchange 
rate changes in the instrument rule can pay off in terms of reduced inflation 
variance (Ball, 1999, Taylor, 1999b).  
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III.   Empirical Evidence of the Taylor rule 
1. Preliminaries 
Many studies show that monetary policy in Germany‡ and the hypothetical 
euro area prior to 1999 followed the Taylor principle with β2 exceeding 1.§ With 
respect to ECB policy, however, the preliminary consensus reached looks rather 
different. The results gained by Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003) and Ullrich (2003) 
who use standard output gap measures based on Hodrick-Prescott-filtered 
industrial production contradict those brought forward both by Fourçans and 
Vranceanu (2002) who take the annual growth rate of industrial production as a 
measure of the business cycle and by the literature on Taylor rules for both 
Germany and the hypothetical euro area. While Fourçans and Vranceanu (2002) 
find the ECB to react strongly to variations in the inflation rate and much less to 
output variations, both Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003) and Ullrich (2003) 
somewhat surprisingly identify small reactions to inflation and - both in relative 
and in absolute terms - strong responses to output deviations. Fourçans and 
Vranceanu (2002) arrive at coefficient estimates of β1=0.18 and β2=1.16 for the 
sample 1999:4-2002:2. Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003) estimate β1=0.30 and 
β2=0.45 based on a sample 1999:1-2002:1. For a sample of 1999:1-2002:8, 
                                                 
‡  See, for instance, Clarida et al. (1998), Clausen and Hayo (2002), Faust et al. (2001), 
Peersman and Smets (1998) and Smant (2002).  
§
  See, e.g., Clausen, Hayo (2002), Gerlach-Kristen (2003), Gerlach, Schnabel (2000), 
Peersman, Smets (1998), and Ullrich (2003).  
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Ullrich (2003) comes up with β1=0.63 and β2=0.25.** Furthermore, Ullrich (2003) 
observes a structural break between pre-1999 and post-1999 monetary policy in 
the euro area.  
2. The data issue 
Following most of the literature, we use ex-post realized data and apply the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate the ECB and the Fed reaction 
function. In order to compare a Taylor Rule with actual monetary policy, we need 
to find proxies for the stance of monetary policy, inflation and the output gap. We 
conduct the GMM estimations both for quarterly and monthly data. All data are 
seasonally adjusted. Data are taken from Bloomberg and Thomson Financial.  
The sample period for our estimations of the ECB and Fed interest setting 
behaviour is 1999Q1 to 2005Q02. We measure actual monetary policy by the 
three-month money market rates (ISR_EU and ISR_US). Euro area inflation is 
measured by the year-on-year percentage change in the harmonised index of 
consumer prices for the euro area (D4LNCPI_EU). US inflation is calculated on 
the basis of the consumer price index (D4LNCPI_US). Money growth is 
measured by the year-on-year percentage change in M3 for the euro area 
(D4LNM3_EU), and by the year-on-year percentage change in M2 for the US 
(D4LNM2_US). The output gap (OUTPUTGAP_EU and OUTPUTGAP_US) is 
calculated by the first difference between real GDP in logs and the Hodrick-
                                                 
**
  A further example is Surico (2003a) who comes up with the following estimates: 
β1=0.77 and β2=0.47 for the sample 1997:07-2002:10.  
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Prescott filtered log real GDP with the smoothing parameter set at λ = 1600).†† As 
exchange rate variable we used the annual growth rate of the nominal dollar 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro (GROWTH_EUROUSD), i.e. the first difference 
of order 4 of the log exchange rate (Taylor, 2001, p. 6). Since the null hypothesis 
of non-stationarity cannot be rejected for the levels of our exchange rate variable 
but can be rejected for the first differences at the usual 5 percent level, we used 
first differences of the exchange rate variable in our regressions.‡‡ As usual, we 
applied the first difference of order 4 in strict analogy with our measure of the 
inflation rate. An increase of the exchange rate variable indicates an appreciation 
of the euro.  
As far as the output gap specification is concerned, we strictly follow Clarida 
et al. (1998) and Faust et al. (2001) and finalize our analysis with the 
complementary use of monthly data. In this case of monthly data, we use the 
industrial production index for the euro area and apply a standard Hodrick-
Prescott filter (with the smoothing parameter set at λ = 14,400) to calculate the 
                                                 
†† However, in the simulations part of this paper, we complementarily use monthly data 
(Belke and Gros, 2005). Since our measure of the output gap based on industrial 
production is much more volatile than Taylor’s (1993) original GDP-based output gap, 
the results might be biased and we mainly focus on the results based on GDP series 
and quarterly data, as is also sometimes preferred in the literature (see, e.g. the survey 
by Ullrich, 2003). 
‡‡  We used a wide spectrum of unit root tests, among others, e.g., the ADF-test, the 
Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock DF-GLS test and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
test. The results are available on request. 
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output gap as the deviation of the logarithm of actual industrial production from 
its trend.§§  
In the case of monthly data, we base our analysis of the ECB behaviour on 
the period from January 1999 to August 2005. The analysed time period for the 
US comprises the “Greenspan era”, starting in August 1987. As exchange rate 
variable we used the annual growth rate of the nominal dollar exchange rate vis-à-
vis the euro (GROWTH_USEUR), i.e. the first difference of order 12 of the log 
exchange rate. An increase of the exchange rate variable indicates an appreciation 
of the euro. 
3. The estimation issue 
The GMM approach essentially consists of an instrumental variables 
estimation of equation (1) and becomes necessary because at the time of an 
interest rate decision, the ECB cannot observe the ex post realized 
contemporaneous right-hand side variables in equations (1) to (3). Hence, it bases 
its decisions on information which comprises lagged variables only. The 
weighting matrix in the objective function is chosen in order to allow the GMM 
estimates to be robust to possible heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of 
unknown form in the error terms (for a recent application see Carstensen and 
Colavecchio, 2004).  
The chosen instruments need to be predetermined at the time of an interest 
rate decision. Hence, they have to be dated on period t-1 or earlier. They should 
help to predict the contemporaneous variables which are still unobserved at time t. 
                                                 
§§  Despite the increasing share of services in the overall economy, it is still commonly 
assumed that the industrial sector is the ‘cycle maker’ and that it leads significant parts 
of the economy. See Sauer and Sturm (2003).  
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For exactly this purpose, we include the first four lags of the nominal interest rate, 
inflation, the output gap, money growth, and the euro-dollar exchange rate. The 
former three variables are typically used as instruments in related work (Sauer and 
Sturm, 2003, Gerdesmeier and Roffia, 2003, and Ullrich, 2003). We also include 
money growth and the nominal euro-dollar exchange rate. The choice of a 
relatively small number of lags for the instruments is intended to minimize the 
potential small sample bias that may arise when too many over-identifying 
restrictions are imposed. To confirm that we have chosen an appropriate 
instrument set, we run a first stage regression of inflation and other variables of 
equation (1) to (3) on the instrumental variables and perform an F-test for their 
joint significance (Kamps and Pierdzioch, 2002).  
A second important property of the instrumental variables is their exogeneity 
with respect to the central bank decisions and, hence, their uncorrelatedness with 
the disturbances which reflect deviations from the policy rule that are 
unpredictable ex ante. To test this property, we perform a standard J-test for the 
validity of the over-identifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982, and Tables 1 and 2). 
We dispense with the robustness checks by means of the ordinary OLS procedure 
which are widely used in the literature because otherwise the regressors would 
unlikely be weakly exogenous. 
4. Empirical results for ECB policy 
Table 1 presents a review of three different Taylor rule estimations based on 
our equations (1) to (3), using quarterly data. Column (3, equation (1)) shows the 
baseline scenario of equation (1). The degree of interest rate smoothing and the 
ECB’s response to inflation is rather small, whereas the weight of the output gap 
is large (and significantly larger than for inflation).  
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Compared to the original Taylor rule which postulates weights of 0.5 both for 
the output gap and inflation, respectively, the influence of the business cycle 
situation on the decisions of the ECB seems to be strong. However, the inflation 
weight proves to be smaller than according to the original Taylor rule and falls 
considerably below 1. Hence, the so-called Taylor principle β2>1 which would 
guarantee that an increase in the nominal interest rate causes an increase in the 
real interest rate with the desired dampening impact on inflation is clearly not 
fulfilled. However, note that our findings are in line with the few other available 
studies.  
- Table 1 here - 
Adding money growth and the exchange rate change to the Taylor rule 
specification (column 4, equation (2)), leads to a slightly different picture. 
Independent from the significance of the output gap and the inflation rate, we are 
able to establish a significant impact of money on the interest rate decisions. 
Moreover, the coefficient of money growth is positive as expected from theory. 
Presumably, this result is caused by the fact that the ECB considered the high 
money growth rates in the aftermath of the stock market downswing as portfolio 
adjustments that did make interest rate responses necessary.*** At the same time 
and most remarkably, the coefficient of inflation changes becomes negative. One 
explanation for this quite striking result might be that the ECB pursued its anti-
                                                 
***  For a detailed analysis of the effects of the stock market downswing and the 
accompanying financial uncertainty on EMU money demand and on measures of 




inflationary course by means of reacting to higher money growth rather than to 
actual inflation.  
Another explanation might be that the ECB might not have responded 
strongly to actual inflation due to uncertainty and data release lags. Since inflation 
expectations on the part of the ECB (operationalised by the bank’s near-term 
inflation outlook as published in the Bulletins) tended to fall short of actual future 
inflation in our sample, it should make a difference for the estimates which 
variables are used – actual or expected ones.††† Finally, the time profile of the lag 
structure in the relation between money growth and consumer price inflation 
works reasonably well as an explanation – as shown by an additional investigation 
of the correlations between the respective time series. Although both parameters 
for inflation and for money growth appear to be very close, a simple Wald test of 
coefficient restrictions (whose results are available on request) reveals that the 
sum between both coefficient estimates is significant, i.e. we have to reject the 
null hypothesis that the estimates are numerically the same in absolute values. 
Hence, there is no need to look for a special explanation of numerically equal 
parameter estimates. 
                                                 
†††  Giannone, Reichlin and Sala (2002), p. 11, deliver a third competing argument. 
They argue that the reaction function used here is not conditioned on shocks like 
demand or technology shocks but on the variables themselves. The use of a reaction 
function not conditioned on shocks might result in a coefficient smaller than unity 
depending on the ratio of inflation variance caused by demand to inflation variance 
caused by technology. A low value of this ratio causes a small coefficient. For a 
similar argument see also Ullrich (2003), p. 10. 
12 
 
In our final specification (column (5), equation (3)), the inflation variable 
even becomes insignificant. However, the coefficient of the output gap, albeit 
smaller, stays highly significant. Again, also in specification 3 the high 
significance and the high value of the estimated coefficient of the output gap in 
the ECB reaction function deserves special attention, even though it possesses a 
coefficient lower than the other tabulated specifications. Thus, there is again clear 
evidence of a business cycle orientation of the ECB. 
Even though the coefficient of the exchange rate is relatively small compared 
to the ones of the other explanatory variables, it is highly significant and displays 
the expected negative sign. As discussed in Taylor (2001), an appreciation of the 
euro leads to a relaxation of monetary policy. Moreover, our point estimates are in 
the range analysed by Taylor (1999b). According to our estimates, a one percent 
devaluation of the euro leads to a long-run interest increase of four basis points. 
The significance of the coefficient of the exchange rate – although it is quite small 
– suggests that including the exchange rate leads to a stable specification (3) 
which describes the monetary policy rule of the ECB pretty well. By this, we 
empirically corroborate the rule of thumb that – as a monetary policy rule - a 
substantial appreciation of the exchange rate furnishes a prima facie case for 
relaxing monetary policy (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995, pp. 93, and section II). 
One interpretation of this rule of thumb would be that the coefficient of the 
exchange rate change is less than zero. Then a higher than normal exchange rate 
would call on the central bank to lower the short-term interest rate, which 
presumably would represent a relaxing of monetary policy. Or, the appreciation of 
the exchange rate today (period t, say) will increase the probability that the central 
bank will lower the interest rate in the future (period t+1, say). With a rational 
expectations model of the term structure of interest rates, these expectations of 
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lower future short term interest rates will tend to lower long-term interest rates 
today. Thus the appreciation of the exchange rate, through the effects of exchange 
rate transmission and the existence of a policy rule, will result in a decline in 
interest rates today. However, our results do not support the competing view that 
policy makers should heed the Obstfeld-Rogoff warning that substantial 
departures from PPP, in the short run and even over decades make such a policy 
reaction to the exchange rate undesirable. 
Let us finally turn to the issue of interest rate smoothing. Note that our 
estimates of ρ, which range from 0.65 to 0.75, are quite high. However, 
coefficients are not so close to 1 so that the estimation uncertainty of the long-run 
weights would become really large. In fact, our results are in line with 
Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003) who estimate ρ to be 0.72 and Fourçans and 
Vranceanu (2002) who arrive at an estimate of ρ=0.73.  
The findings above appear to be robust in the sense that the J-statistic testing 
the over-identifying restrictions is insignificant across all specifications tested. In 
Table 1, we use the J-statistic to test the validity of over-identifying restrictions 
when we have (as in our case) more instruments than parameters to estimate. 
Under the null-hypothesis, that is the over-identifying restrictions are satisfied, the 
J-statistic multiplied by the number of regression observations is asymptotically 
distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying 
restrictions (Favero, 2001). According to the results tabulated in the second last 
row of Table 1, all our models are correctly specified because all p-values are 
higher than their critical counterparts.  
Overall, the results displayed in Table 1 are conclusive. All regressions show 
that interest rate policy from 1999 on did not follow the Taylor principle as β2 
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does not exceed 1 consistently. The inflation parameter for the ECB period (β2) is 
usually lower than the output parameter (β1) and does not exceed one. Hence, 
from this pattern one might even conclude that the ECB tended to accommodate 
changes in inflation. This is also suggested by the standard specification in 
column 3 of Table 1 which reports a positive and significant coefficient for 
inflation.  
The results presented above accentuate those of Gerdesmeier and Roffia 
(2003) and Ullrich (2003), who suggest that the ECB reacts to a rise in expected 
inflation by raising nominal short-term interest rates by a relatively small amount 
and thus letting real short-term interest rates decline. Hence, instead of continuing 
the Bundesbank’s inflation stabilising policy, the ECB appears to have followed a 
policy rather comparable to the pre-Volcker era of the Fed, for which e.g. Taylor 
(1999a) and Clarida et al. (2000) have found values for β2 well below one.‡‡‡  
5. Estimation results for Fed policy  
Table 2 presents a review of three different Taylor rule estimations based on 
equations (1) to (3) for the US, again using quarterly data.  
The results for the basic specification are displayed in Table 2 (column (3), 
equation (1)). Using ex post measured variables in the baseline specification (1) 
leads to a rather strong interest rate smoothing, a large weight of the output gap 
and an even larger one of inflation. Compared to the original Taylor rule with 
weights of 0.5 both for the output gap and inflation, respectively, the impact of 
                                                 
‡‡‡  Taylor (1999a) arrives at values of β1 = 0.25 and β2 = 0.81 with ex-post data for 
the US for that period, while Orphanides (2001) estimates a forward-looking rule with 
real-time data and reports β1= 0.57 and β2 =1.64. 
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inflation on Fed decisions is relatively strong. However, the weights of inflation 
and of the output gap are not too different. The inflation weight is larger than in 
the original Taylor rule and considerably above 1. Hence, the so-called Taylor 
principle β2>1 is clearly fulfilled. Hence, an increase in the nominal interest rate 
tends to cause an increase in the real interest rate and a dampening of inflation.  
- Table 2 here - 
 Adding money growth to the baseline variables yields (column (4), 
equation (2)), which has a stronger degree of interest rate smoothing than before. 
This does not change the pattern of the results for inflation and the output gap at 
all. However, in contrast to our estimates for the ECB, the sign of the coefficient 
of M2 growth is negative. Hence, higher M2 growth tends to lead to lower 
realisations of the policy variable. 
If we finally include dollar-euro exchange rate changes in our Taylor rule 
specification (column (5) of Table 2), the coefficient of inflation remains highly 
significant. The coefficient of the output gap is even larger and again highly 
significant. Even though the coefficient of the exchange rate is relatively small 
compared to the ones of the other explanatory variables, it is clearly significant 
and has the expected positive sign (see section II). An appreciation of the euro (a 
rising exchange rate) leads to a more restrictive monetary policy of the Fed. 
According to our estimates, a one percent devaluation of the dollar leads to a 
long-run interest increase of twelve basis points. This interest rate reaction is three 
times as high as in the ECB case. 
 At last, we should make some comments on the estimated extent of the 
Fed’s interest rate smoothing behaviour (row 2 of Table 2). The parameter  ρ is 
estimated to be significantly larger than in the euro area and falls into a range 
between 0.84 and 0.91. From an economic point of view, our evidence on interest 
16 
 
rate smoothing can be interpreted as follows. Since it captures the impact of the 
lagged interest rate on the current interest rate decision i becomes more and more 
important as ρ tends to one. Consequently, the relative importance of other 
explanatory variables should diminish. It may even be the case that they are not 
suitable anymore to explain the long run patterns of the policy variable (see, e.g., 
Carstensen and Colavecchio, 2004, p. 11). However, we observe exactly the 
opposite in the case of the Fed. The additional variables are highly significant and 
have coefficients which are large in absolute and relative terms. Overall, the 
smoothing parameter estimates a bit more away from 1 are obtained in the 
specifications 1 and 3 where the money growth indicator is not included.  
IV. Simulations 
 To shed light on the question as to whether the central bank complied with 
the Taylor rule in the more recent past, we make use of one-period-ahead 
forecasts. By doing so, we should be able to quantify the difference between the 
actual and the fitted, or Taylor, interest rate. We make use of static one-step-ahead 
forecasts based on our specifications of the Taylor reaction functions including 
interest smoothing behaviour.  
 In this context, (a) in-sample and (b) out-of-sample forecasts will be 
produced. Case (a) allows to investigate whether the central bank sets interests 
rates according to a Taylor rule which is estimated based on data for the whole 
available sample period. Case (b) shall provide insights as to whether the central 
banks stuck to their rule, which was estimated for a sub-period, throughout the 
total period under review.  
 While our in-sample forecasts (case (a)) are based on exactly the same 
estimations and especially the same estimation period which were presented in 
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Tables 1 and 2, our out-of-sample forecasts (case (b)) necessitate the re-estimation 
of the same specifications for a shorter time-horizon. This ex-ante forecasting or 
post-sample prediction exercise helps forecasting observations that do not appear 
in the data set used to estimate the forecasting equation. Since case (b) would 
have resulted in a serious lack of degrees of freedom due to insufficient data 
points, we decided to make use of monthly data if we enact out-of-sample 
forecasts.§§§ 
 Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the results of the in-sample forecasts of monetary 
policy according to a Taylor rule which is estimated over the whole available 
sample independent on the start of the forecast period (case (a)). Figures 3 and 4 
exhibit the prediction of a Taylor rule over the whole sample when this Taylor 
rule is estimated only up to the start of the out-of-sample forecast period (case 
(b)). Each Figure contains three graphs which depict the course of actual monetary 
policy together with the Taylor rule estimated by equations (1) to (3).  
 Our first choice for setting the start date of the forecast period is (the 11th) 
September 2001, because this started a period of unprecedented political and 
financial market instability. The second choice would be the turn-of-year 2000/01, 
with which came the meltdown of stock market valuations (Belke and Gros, 
2005). The exact dates of the chosen sample splits are recorded in the tables.  
- Figure 1, 2, 3 and 4 here - 
 As far as the in-sample forecasts for the euro area are concerned, the 
estimated realisations of the central bank rate follow closely the actual interest 
                                                 
§§§  Inoue and Kilian (2002) show that in-sample tests of predictability are at least as 
credible as the results of out-of-sample tests. Hence, there is no reason to emphasize 
only one type of forecasts a priori. 
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rate. This should be of little surprise, given the rather high R-squared of the 
estimations in Tables 1 and 2. In the most recent quarters in 2005, however, the 
Taylor rate slightly exceeded the actual ECB rate (the opposite is the case for the 
first two quarters of 2005 with regard to the Fed). This would imply that euro 
interest rates are currently slightly too low as compared with the implicit Taylor 
rule.  
 Next, according to the Taylor specifications including money growth, both 
monetary policies have been too expansionary during the third and the fourth 
quarter of 2001 and the first and the second quarter of 2004. A similar pattern 
emerges for specifications (2) and (3). In contrast, if one considers the 
specification including the exchange rate, euro area monetary policy appeared to 
have slightly too strict from the first quarter of 2002 until the first quarter of 2004. 
Let us now turn to our out-of-sample forecasts of the policy variable for the ECB 
and the Fed. 
 Note again that out-of-sample forecasting represents a particularly 
interesting exercise, as it allows detecting deviations of actual monetary policy 
rates from normative Taylor rate levels. Since it is generally agreed that 
evaluating forecasts must be done exclusively on their ex ante performance, we 
mainly comment on Figures 3 and 4.  
 As far as the euro area is concerned, one finds a significant negative 
deviation of the actual interest rate from the estimated interest rate which 
corresponds to the (Taylor) rule from the midst-of-2003 on up to August 2005. 
This is striking especially because we also included the estimated extent of 
interest rate smoothing in the normative Taylor interest rate and, by this, corrected 
for stickiness in interest rate setting in times of uncertainty. Overall, we conclude 
that ECB monetary policy has been to be too expansionary already since two 
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years. The negative deviations of actual rates from the rule might be interpreted as 
a clear sign that the bank has significantly downgraded the role of money in its 
policy strategy and actual policy making since May 2003. 
 Fed actions appear to have been significantly different from that of the 
ECB. In fact, the Fed seems to have strictly followed its Taylor rule since 
2000/01. Such a conclusion alters only if the change of the euro-dollar exchange 
rate is included in the Taylor rule specification. Here, the Fed did not react to the 
depreciation of the dollar as sharply as it did prior to 2000/2001. One explanation 
for this pattern might be that, given its multi-indicator approach, the Fed might 
have tried to help reducing the current account deficit by short-term rate changes. 
This could also explain why the fit between the actual and Taylor rate as shown in 
Figure 4, third graph, is not as perfect as depicted in Taylor (1993).  
 In general, the standard Taylor rule, with the Taylor’s normative weights, 
appears to be a much better way to characterise the rate setting behaviour of the 
Fed than that of the ECB. Moreover, the Fed has shown a stronger (preference 
for) interest rate smoothing under the Taylor rule compared with the ECB. That 
might explain why, following the crisis of 2000/2001, the Fed’s rates have 
remained in line with the Taylor rate whereas the ECB has deviated from its pre-
crisis Taylor rule policy behaviour.  
V. Concluding Remarks 
According to the findings presented in this paper, the interest rate setting 
behaviour of the ECB and the Fed in the period 1999 to 2005 and 1987 to 2005, 
respectively, can be pretty well characterised by some form of Taylor rule. 
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However, the standard Taylor rule appears to be a much better tool for modelling 
the behaviour of the Fed than that of the ECB.**** 
 The empirical estimates for the euro area suggest that the ECB put a larger 
weight on the output gap relative to inflation. Such a conclusion is shared by other 
authors. Faust et al. (2001) argue that the ECB puts too high a weight on the 
output gap relative to inflation, especially in comparison to the Bundesbank. 
However, the low weight which the ECB has assigned to inflation might be due to 
the fact that inflation was fairly low in the sample period. Moreover, the estimates 
also show that money growth appear to have played an important role in the ECB’ 
rate setting. Moreover, the exchange rate had a small, albeit significant effect as 
well.  
 The test results indicate that the Fed has been following the estimated 
Taylor rule in a rather stable manner during the Greenspan era. This does not 
change if money growth is included as an additional variable in the Taylor rule, 
but it becomes somewhat less obvious when the change of the euro-dollar 
exchange rate is taken into account. As a particularly interesting side-aspect, 
money growth seems to have played an important role in Fed rate decisions as 
well.  
 Comparing the Taylor rule estimations of the two central banks, Fed 
displayed a much greater tendency for interest rate smoothing compared with its 
counterpart in the euro area. This might explain why, following the crisis of 
2000/2001, the Fed’s rates have remained fairly in line with the Taylor rate (even 
                                                 
****  See, however, Österholm (2005) who conjectures that the Taylor rule appears to 




in view of a series of unprecedented interest rate cuts), whereas the ECB has 
deviated from its pre-crisis Taylor rule policy behaviour.  
 In fact, the findings do not suggest that the ECB has followed a stable rate 
setting pattern stabilizing throughout the sample period, whereas the Fed appears 
to have adhered to its rate setting behaviour. In fact, the ECB seems to have 
pursued too expansionary a policy after 2000/01.  
 Looking at contemporaneous Taylor rules, our results suggests that the 
ECB has de facto even accommodated changes in inflation and, hence, might have 
even followed a pro-cyclical, e.g. destabilising, policy. In contrast to the Fed, the 
ECB’s nominal policy rate changes were not large enough to actually influence 
real short term interest rates. Such an interpretation gives rise to the conjecture 
that the ECB follows a policy quite similar to the pre-Volcker era of US monetary 
policy, a time also known as the “Great Inflation” (Taylor, 1999a).  
However, in view of the results above some words of caution might be in 
order. In general and in relation to data used in the applications, the number of the 
observations is rather small (only 26 - 1999Q1 to 2005Q2). Therefore, the 
estimations risk to be not robust. It is important to recognize this drawback in the 
analysis. We addressed this caveat in the paper for instance when we enhanced the 
frequency of the data set, i.e. applied monthly instead of quarterly data. 
However, one should always be aware of the fact that time series properties 
are more a question of the time span (sample issue) than of the numbers of 
observations investigated. Hence, we will be able to come up with more 
satisfactory results in terms of degrees of freedom only when some further time 
will have elapsed. Nevertheless, it is time now to follow pioneers in the field (see 
section III.1) and to actually estimate an ECB reaction function. We feel all the 
more legitimised to do so because (a) our time span clearly goes beyond those 
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samples used in the above mentioned studies by nearly 100 percent and (b) we 
follow those studies by complementarily using monthly data in order to escape the 
problem of limited degrees of freedom (although one should be aware that this is 
only a limited device to assess time series properties more accurately). 
More specifically, Clarida et al. (2000, p. 154) argues that a short sample with 
little variability in inflation, especially with only small deviations from the target 
rate, might lead to too low an estimate of the inflation parameter. So far, data are 
only available for less than two completed business cycles and the actual inflation 
rate is close to the target the ECB has set itself. In that sense, recent inflation rates 
are not at all comparable to those during the 1970s. It might also be the case that 
the ECB would act much more aggressively against larger deviations of inflation 
from its own goal than can be seen in the data so far. As suggested by e.g. Clarida 
and Gertler (1996), central banks react differently to expected inflation above 
trend as compared to expected inflation below trend. They show that the 
Bundesbank clearly reacted in the former case, whereas in the latter case they 
hardly responded. Given data limitations, it is too early for us to tell whether or 
not the same holds for the ECB.  
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Table 1: Empirical Taylor reaction functions of the ECB GMM estimations, 







































Exchange rate β4   -0.04*** 
(0.009) 
Statistics     







R-squared  0.95 0.95 0.95 
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses below the estimated values (*/**/*** 
indicating significance on the 10/5/1 percent level), p-values are given in parentheses 
below the J-test statistics (df = degrees of freedom). For the GMM estimation the first 
four lags of the short-term interest rate, the inflation rate, the output gap, the money 
growth rate (if implemented), and the rate of change of the dollar-euro exchange rate (if 
implemented) are used as instruments (see, e.g., Kamps and Pierdzioch, 2002, Carstensen 
and Colavecchio, 2004).  
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Table 2: Empirical Taylor reaction functions of the Fed GMM estimations, 



































Money β3  -0.85* 
(0.59)  
Exchange rate β4   0.12*** 
(0.03) 
Statistics     






R-squared  0.97 0.97 0.96 
Notes: see Table 1.  
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Figure 1: Short-term interest rate and Taylor rate in the euro area  
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Note: One-Period-ahead in-sample forecasts based on GMM estimates. For details see 
footnotes to Table 1.  
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Figure 2: Short-term interest rate and Taylor rate in the US 2001Q3-2005Q2, full-
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Note: One-Period-ahead in-sample forecasts based on GMM estimates. For details see 
footnotes to Table 1. 
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Figure 3: Short-term interest rate and Taylor rate in the euro area 2001M05-
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Note: Out-of-sample forecasts based on GMM estimates. Estimation period is 1999M01 
2001M04 for the first two figures and 1999M01 2001M05 for the last figure. For the first 
two figures, the forecast period amounts to 2001M05-2005M08, and for the last figure it 




Figure 4: Short-term interest rate and Taylor rate in the US 2001M01-2005M08, 
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Note: Out-of-sample forecasts based on GMM estimates. Estimation period lasts from the 
start of the Greenspan area August 1987 until the start of the crisis of 2000/2001 in 
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